The principles of targeting by Besley, Timothy & Kanbur, Ravi
Policy,  Re"arch,  and  Extemal  Affairs
WORKING  PAPERS
Poverty
Office  of  the Vice  President
Development  Economics








Administrative and data-collection costs, individual responses
to targeted interventions, and considerations of political econ-
omy make it difficult to establish workable procedures for fine
targeting of spending to alleviate poverty.  Self targeting and
targeting by indicators offer more advantages than other ap-
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In response to calls for finer targeting of spend-  Two types of targeting, although short of the ing to alleviate poverty in developing countries,  ideal, may be useful in certain contexts. Besley and Kanbur discuss the principles of
targeting.  With statistical  targeting  (using  indicators).
programs target key indicators such as a region, The ideal soluiion - the benchmark for dis-  occupation, or the crops grown.  (It might be cussion - is that all transfers go to the poor.  easier, for example, to target everyone in a low- The ideal solution is unrealizable because of  income neighborhood, particularly when it is three factors:  difficult to identify individual incomes.)
The costs of administration and data collec-  Self-targeting  uses differences in needs, tion.  tastes, or incomes as a device for achieving self-
selection by only the poor into poverty allevia- * Individual responses and incentive effects.  tion programs.
* Considerations of political economy.  Real progress in understanding how target-
ing works best can be made only through The best strategy will probably lie some-  counzry-specific research that quantifies the where between the two extremes - the ideai  costs and benefits of targeting using data that solution and universal intervention - mediated  has increasingly become available for many de- by these three considerations.  veloping countries - and research that is
sensitive to the political realities of reform.
TPe PRE Working Paper Series disseminates thC  findings of woTk  under way in the Bark's Policy, "esearch  and Extemal Affairs Complex. An objectivc of the series is to get these fuidings out quickly. even if presentations are less than fully polished. The rindings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily repTesent  official Bank policy.





Table  of  Contents
1.  Introduction  2
2.  The  Basic  Problem  and  the  Ideal  Solution  3
3.  Administrative  Costs  5
4.  Individual  Responses  and  Incentive  Effects  8
5.  The  Political  Economy  of  Targeting  10
6.  Targeting  Using  Indicators  12
7.  Self  Targeting  17
7.1  Workfare  17
7.2  Transfers  In-Kind  18
8.  Conclusion  20
References  21
Appendix  23
1  An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  preserted  to  the  Wo.ld  Bank  symposium
on  Poverty  and  Adjustment,  April  11-13,  1988.  We  are  grateful  to  Stephen  Coate
for  comments.2
1. Introduction
In  the  realm of poverty  alleviation policies, it  is often  argued that  the  "best"
solution is one which identifies who is poor and then targets benefits towards that  group.
The debate  on  targeting is  an old one and moreover, it  has been as  much a  topic of
controversy in  developed countries as  in  developing countries 2. Commentators have
emphasised the costliness of identifying the poor and the effects on incentives which may
attend income tested programs 3. The counterpoint is to recommend  universalistic programs
which provide benefits which are paid independently  of income. However,  it is in the wake
of macroeconomic and  structural  adjustment  that  targeting  seems to  have attained  a
special significance in developing countries, as more and more governments have come
under pressure to reduce expenditure. Indeed, targeting has become  a panacea in the area
of poverty alleviation,  whlence  it is suggested  that poliey  makers  c-an  have their  al-ei  sand
eat it too - improved targeting means that more poverty alleviation could be achieved with
less expenditure!  Alas, the real world is not quite  so straightforward.  There are good
reasons why this best of all possible worlds  is not available to policy makers in developing
countries and hard decisions  will have to be made that  weigh up the costs and benefits of
targeting.
The object of this paper is to provide a framework for considering  the principles of
targeting to alleviate poverty.  Since the focus is on the priincples, much of the discussion
will be at  a  general and abstract  level.  However, these principles are  intended to  be
applicable in  particular  Less Developed Countries where upon the  flesh of institutional
knowledge must be added.  Section 2 begins by stating the basic problem in a very -simple
framework and here we present the ideal solution: a  case of  "perfect targeting".  The
following  sections take up three central problems with this solution - administrative costs,
high marginzJ tax  rates  and political economy considerations.  Each of these militates
2See  the contributions in Garfinkel  [19821.
sKa-tbar [1987a]  reviews  the issues in the light of recent US and UK policy.3
against fine targeting and suggest the advantages of more universalistic schemes. Section 6
considers the  'intermediate' option of targeting by indicators.  In section 7, we consider
self-targeting schemes  and section 8 concludes.
2. The Basic Problem and the Ideal Solution
Any discussion on targeting for poverty alleviation presupposes  agreement on what
is meant by poverty i.e.  agreement on (i) a measure of the  "standard of living", (ii) a
"poverty line" which distinguishes the poor from the non-poor and (iii) a "poverty index"
which aggregates  together information on the standard of living of the poor.  Each of these
is an important and controversial topic and would demand a separate paper on its own 4.
For  our purposes, we shall assume that  these problems have been "solved", in  order to
focus attention on tareeting directlv.
Let  us  suppose, initially,  thWt we have  a  household income distribution  which
measures "income" correctly and adjusts for households  facing different prices, household
size and composition  etc.  Suppose  furthermore, that the poverty line is given by z, so that
all those with incomes  less than z are in poverty.  The object of policy is to reduce poverty
to  zero.  The "ideal solution" would be where income can be observed accurately and
costlessly, and where no incentive effects prevent the State from plugging the gap between
the poverty line and income.  The ideal solution is depicted in Figure 1, which plots final
income (i.e. post transfer) against original income.  Along the dotted 450 line there is no
difference  between original and final income 5. A point above this line indicates a subsidy or
transfer, while a point below indicates a withdrawal or tax.  The ideal solution is given by
the solid line.  For anybody with original income y less than z, the government transfers
exactly the  amount z-y  so as to bring final income up to  z.  This completely  eliminates
4On  these issues see Atkinson [1987],  Kanbur [1987bJ.
blt  requires the State to have perfect information about individuals' tastes and charactist5cs
so that individuals are prevented from "pretending" to have incomes below  the poverty line
in order to claim a transfer.4
poverty. The financial  cost of this strategy  is given  by the sum of these transfers  z-y.  If
the distribution  of income was uniform then this cost would simply be depicted by  the
triangular  areas  between  the horizontal  solid  lne and the 450  lne.
The structure of the scheme  for those  with income  above  z depends  on the nature of
the budget constraint. If the transfer/poverty  alleviation  scheme  is to be self-financing,
then those  with incomes  above  z have to be taxed. This is shown  in Figure  1 by the solid
line beyond z lying below  the 450 line.  The larger the tax revenue  to be raised, the
shallower  this Une  will  have to be in order to balance  the budget. Figure  2 makes  explicit
the transfers to and from the government  as a function  of original  income. Below  z, the
transfers  are from  the government  and are therefore  shown  as negative,  whilst  above  z they
are to the government. The slope  of the solid line in Figure 2 is the marginal  tax rate.
Figure 2 shows  that the "ideal solution"  imposes  a higher  marginal tax  rate  on the  nonr
than one the non-poor. We return to this point in Section  4, where  disincentive  effects  of
high  marginal  tax rates are discussed.
If the government  is perfectly  informed,  the ideal solution  is clearly  the least cost
method  of alleviating  poverty.  If external resources  were at stake, or if internal resources
had to be raised to finance  the poverty alleviation  program,  the ideal solution  wouAd  be
preferred. But is it feasible?  It relies  on being  able  to transfer  exactly  the right araount  to
each individual  below the poverty line without affecting  their incentives  to earn.  The
administrative  costs of this in a developing  country  context are taken up in the following
section.  Here we will present the opposite  extreme to the ideal solution, by way of
contrast. This is a completely  universalistic  scheme  which  gives  everybody  a transfer  of z
(i.e. regardless  of income).  This is depicted in Figures 3 and 4.  This scheme also
eliminates  poverty but at a far greater budgetary  cost.  it is easy to see why this is so.
Now  everybody,  even  someone  with original  income  exceeding  z, receives  the transfer  of z
from the government,  (as shown  in Figure  4).  The budgetary  cost  of this is simply  8 times
the population  size. If this is to be recouped  through  taxation,  then the marginal  tax rates5
on the non-poor will need to be higher  than in the ideal sotution,  although  the marginal
tax rates on the poor are now lower.  Figures 5 and 6 depict such a scheme,  which is
discussed  further  in Section  4.
These two extremes  (ideal means testing and universalistic)  serve to anchor our
discussion  of the principles  of targeting. As will become  clear by the end of this paper,
neither extreme  is particularly  appealing. The benefits  of the ideal solution  are clear. The
next four  sections  will  discuss  some  of its costs.
3. Administrative  Costs
Although  the previous  section  developed  its argument  using  the language  of income
transfers,  it is also relevant  to other institutional  settings  - e.g. the analysis  of various  food
subsidy  programs. Prior to the reforms  of 1977,  ration shops in Sri Lanka provided  rice
rations to all Sri Lanka below  market prices. As Besley  and Kanbur [1987]  have shown,
this is equivalent  to an income  transfer equal  to the ration times the effective  subsidy  if
any unwanted  rice can be resold. Hence  it is like a universalistic  program. After  1977,  this
sytem  was gradually  replaced  by a food  stamp program  which  restricted  benefits  to those
households  whose  incomes  were below  a critical value  (the details  are given  in Anand  and
Kanbur, [1987]). This involves  a move towards the ideal solution of the last section.
However,  a recent World Bank [1986]  study  points out some  difficulties  with this attempt
to effect  the "ideal  solution".
"One problem  is inflexibility  in the way a program  detem-ne who is eligible,  as
exemplified  by Sri Lanka's  food  stamp  program. The target group  was  identified  by
household  size and earnings  but, because  households  were never checked  to see if
they remained  eligible,  many stayed on the rolls even  after their earnings  increased
above the eligibility  cut off  Households  that became  eligible  after the program
started, however,  never  had a chance  to get on the polls."
Lest it be thought that this is an isolated  case, the same document  provides  other
examples,  e.g. Brazil:6
"A coupon  program  that distributed  food  every  two weeks  through  government-run
supermarkets  used income to determine  who could participate in Recife Brazil.
The program  revealed  several  problems...  It is difficult  to target income  if income
reporting is arbitrary... A coupon  program requires extensive  book keeping  and
administrative cost... Building on  lessons from the  evaluators, the  Brazilian
program was  modified, with  appar;  . success, to  reach  very  low income
neighborhoods  without coupons  or dowtpayments. Common  basic foods are now
subsidired  for all customers  of many smaI neighborhood  stores in selected  poverty
areas.  Any leakage  of benefits  to people  not in need  is much less expendve  than
administeing  the cumbersome  colupon  program."
One of the main lessons  of the above  Is the difficulty  of assessing  and verifying  low
incomes. This is not even easy in developed  countries,  with their systems of regular
e  3yment and with a literate population  accustomed  to filling in tax returns (see for
example Kay and King [19781). In  developing  countries, where much employment
(especially  that of the poor)  is irregular,  where  there is production  of agricultural  output
for home  consumption  and where  the definition  of a "household"  is problematic,  one would
suspect a priori that the administrative  costs  involved  in the ideal solution  are high. The
frequency  of testing is also necessary  as the Sri Lankan case illustrates, to ensure those
genuinely in  need are in  the  scheme and to  weed out  those who are not.  The
administrative  capacity  to do this simply  does  not exist in many (perhaps  most) developing
countries. Macedo  11987]  identifies  cases  in Brazil where the authorities relied on local
committees  to identify  the needy,  and he points  to the difficulties  to which  this gave  rise.
The quantification  of administrative  costs by program will not be an easy task,
particularly  if costs are shared by several  programs. However,  some  allocation  formulae
might be feasible.  The revenue  required R, of a  program can be divided into three
categories:
R =  A + NP + P
where A are administrative  costs, NP are transfers  (leakages)  to the non-poor or more
generally  to those not in the target group,  while  P is the effective  trasfer  to the poor. A7
measure  of the fineness  of targeting  is then given  by
F~  p  +  NP
i.e. the fraction  of the total non-administrative  outlay that reaches  the target group. The
administrative  costs  as a proportion  of the revenues  are:
C =  A
CA  +  P  +  NP
It is hypothesized  that C rises with F and at an increasing  rate.  This is illustrated in
Figure 7.  Figure 7 also assumes  that there is a minimum  level of admid.-tration  costs
needed  to get any program  going,  and that a basic  minimum  level of targeting  can always
be achieved. For example,  if the total non-administrative  budget is divided  equally  among
the population,  with no attempt at targeting, the fraction  of the outlay that goes to the
pretransfer  poor  is given  by the fraction  of poor people  in the population,  i.e. the incidence
of poverty. This much targeting  is always  possible,  even  with the opposite  extreme  of the
ideal solution. It is the shape  of the curve  between  F and 1 upon which  we require  more
information  yet it is the one about which  we  are most  ignorant  at present 6.
Quantifying  administrative costs of poverty alleviation programs is  clearly an
important issue for future research  since the efficacy  of means tested programs  depend
upon it in an important  way.
'For de7eloped  countries  there has been some collation  of evidence. Kesselman  [1982]
classified  several  programmes  into "universal"  or "tested". Of the seven  U.K. programmes
considered  two were unviersal  and five tested.  Administrative  costs as a percentage  of
benefits  were  3.8%  and 3.5%  for the universal  programmes,  while  they ranged  from  5.2o to
15.4%  for the tested progr  es. In the U.S.,  the old age, survivors,  disability  rnd health
insurance programme (a  universal programme) had  administrative costs of  2.5% of
benefits,  while  for public  assistance  and unemployment  insurance  (tested programmes)  the
figures  were 12.1%  and 11.8%. The veterans'  welfare  programme,  a tested programme,  had
an incredible  administrative  cost to benefits  ratio of 95.2%. What seems  to be needed  is
systematic  compilation  and analysis  of such  data for  developing  countries.8
4. Jndiuidual  Respons  and Incentive  Effects
The incentive  effects  of the "ideal  solution"  must also  be v ighed up in assessing  its
applicability,  Besley  [1988]  examines  one aspect  of this - that certain individual  might not
participate  in finely  targeted  programs  because  of the costs  involved  in subjecting  oneself  to
very  detailed  assessment,  filling  out of forms,  attending  interviews  etc.  Alternatively  they
might just be the psychic  costs of the social stigma that  attaches to participation in
programs  specifically  meant  for the poor7.
Besley  [1988]  hypothesizes  that if an individual's  costs of participating  in a finely
targeted poverty  alleviation  program  are %,  then those with income  greater than z-c will
not take part in them. This meam that those  with incomes  between  z and z-c will  remain
below  the  Wpey  li-ne.  The al't.i  vA0  iV thve  a  wmve-ral  sceAme  which  gives
everybody  an amount m, such that the total budgetary  outlay is equal to that of the
targeted  program. These  two alternatives  are illustrated  in Figure  8.  As can be seen,  the
finely targeted program tends to exclude  those just below the poverty line, while the
universalistic  program  with the same budget does not do as much for the poorest of the
poor.  Besley [1988]  provides  some quantification  of these tradeoffs  for assumed  income
distributions. His numerical  simulations  indicate  that the introduction  of take-up costs
does  not turn the tables against  income  testing.
Incentive problems are in significant  measure related to problems of imperfect
information. If the government  found  individuals  transparent i.e. knew  their tastes and
abilities then  taxes and benefiits  could be made to  depend directly upon imutable
characteristics. In fact only income  is observable  (perhaps  not even  this) and by altering
their behavior  to alter their income  agents  can alter the amount of tax/benefit  which  they
?The  latter has been much discussed  in the developed  country  literature (see, for example,
Moffltt,  1983)  but very little, if anything,  has been  written  on it in the developing  country
context.9
pay/receive. This is the root of the incentive  problem'.
The "ideal"  solution  is also  faced  with the problem  that it imposes  a 100%  marginal
tax rate on all those below  the poverty  line. This can be seen  from the fact that the slope
of the solid  line in Figure  2 is below  z. The advantage  claimed  for this is that, since  this is
the  way of alleviating poverty at  least cost (the shaded triangle in Figure 1), in a
self-financing  scheme  the high  marginal  tax rates upon the poor will be offset  by the lower
marginal  tax rates on the non poor. There  is however,  an important  caveat  to be added
marginal  tax rates affect  the incentive  to work  and hence  to earn income  - i.e. income  is
endogenous  and hence  depends  on the tax schedule  implicit  in the program. To see this,
notice that with a 100%  margixl tax rate there is no incentive  for anybody  with original
inccime  below z to work.  All these people  would be better off by not working,  while
ccivn;  r- o  the ggovernmAen.  B-ut 1i  or6izaa incOme  fr  ihete indviduu8  faiis to zero
then the financial  cost of the program  is no longer  depicted  by the triangle  in Figure  1 - it
is now the rectangle  of size Z9.  Thus the marginal  tax rates on the rich will have to be
higher  than that indicated  by the ideal solution. B&-.  this will in turn mean  that the rich
work less hard and  even less revenue is  generated  The  alternative of  having a
universalistic  scheme,  will  have  medium  level  marginal  tax rates on everybody.  The choice
is between  having a distribution  of high marginal  tax rates skewed  in the direction  of the
poor,  or a more  even  spread  of marginal  tax rates.
Clearly,  the final decision  rests with the specifics  of the caset°. Kanbur and Keen
8This  is the motivation  for the analyses  of optim . :ncome  tax problems,  first analysed  by
Mirrlees  [1971].
°Besley  [19881  provides simulations  which suggest that mean tesing is still very often
widely  preferable  to a universalistic  programme  in spite  of these effects.
lOMuch  work  has been  done in the developed  country  context. In a recent exercise  based
on U.S.  data, Sadka,  Garfinkel  and Moreland  [1982]  conclude  that:
"..  the results presented in  this paper are sufficient  to  call into question the
consensus  among  economic  experts  that transfer  programmes  which  provide  benefits
only to those with low incomes  are more  efficient  than those  which  provide  benefits
to all regardless  of  income".10
[1987J  provide  a general theoretical analysis  of the issues.  However,  what is needed  is
detailed  country-specific  analyses  for developing  countries. In the past such analysis  may
have been thought to be problematic  given the lack of adequate  micro data.  But recent
Pdvances  in micro level data collection  makes  this excuse  less plausible. Policy analyses
and research programs  utilizing this data, and addressing  the issue of targeted versus
universalistic  schemes  are now pressing.
5. The Political  Economy  of Targeting
A purely "technocratic"  approach  to the problem  of poverty alleviation  asks only
how the informational,  administrative  and other costs can be taken into account. Whilst
useul, it neglects  issues  of distributional  and political  conflict  which  lie at the heart of the
problem. It is interesting  to consider  the political  support that various types of poverty
alleviation  programs  might enjoy. The "ideal solution"  of Figure 1 will  only rationally  be
supported  by those  with incomes  below  the poverty  line. But this group  is unlikely  to have
sufficient  political  power  to predominate  against  those above  the poverty  line who have to
pay. The universalistic  scheme  of Figure  5 has the advantage  that it brings  into the net of
beneficiaries  some  people  with incomes  above  the poverty  line. It pits the "middle  classes"
between  z and y in Figure  5 against  those with the highest  incomes. This contrasts  with
the "ideal  solution".
Tullock  (1982]  espouses  the view  that universalistic  schemes  are a way  of  minimizing
net transfers  to the poor:
"When we  consider the  political forces which may  lead  to  the  expansion
[universalization]  of a  program it  is, in general, clear that  if people who are
interested  in expanding  the program  are tryng merely  to help the poor, they have
chosen  an inept way  of doing  it.  Only if they feel that they can trick members  of
the middle and upper class into voting for a program  to help the poor by that
indirect method which  is more  generous  than they are willing  to give a direct and
open  way,  is it sensible."
Tullock's views are  however controversial (see  Downs [1982]).  Nevertheless  the11
considerations  that he raises  are relevant to the recent debate in developing  countries  on
moving  awa; from universalistic  schemes  (such  as general  food  subsidies)  towards  targeted
schemes  such  as food  stamps  based  on income  criteria. If a constant  budget  is maintained
this entails a net loss to the middle and upper income  classest'.  The tolerance  of the
political  system  then becomes  an issue. Bienen  and Gersovitz  [1985]  have  analyzed  recent
attempts to remove  food  subsidies  (in the context of a larger stabilization  and adjustment
program). Their  work  demonstrates  the importance  of particular  countries'  circumstances,
i.e. the existing  configurations  of power  and the possibilities  for  power  realignment:
"IMF programs  may also incorporate  cutbacks  in subsidies  for goods, especially
those  disproportionately  purchased  basic  needs  programs,  it should  be noted,  benefit
urban middle classes.  Mexico's  middle classes,  for example,  frequently  shop in
subsidized retail  outlets  ...  But  elites are  reluctant  to  make precipitous policy
changes that  threaten their support... Exceptions  include regimes  in Sri Lanka
(1977),  Turkey (1984)  and Zimbabwe  (1984)  that  did successfully  cut consumer
good  subidies."
However,  if a universal  program  is in fact removed  and a targeted program  is substituted,
this means that the poor are isolated  in terms of political alliances. The history of Sri
Lanka since 1977 in  relation to  food subsidies (see Anand and  Kanbur [1987])  is
particularly  instructive.  After the introduction  of targeting with food stamps, the real
value  of food stamps  was allowed  to fall during  an ensuing  period  of inflation,  with severe
consequences  for poverty  and undernutrition. With the new institutional arrangements,
the interests of the middle  classes  lay elsewhere  (the maintenance  of public sector wages,
for example)  and the poor were to some  extent abandoned  to their own political  devices.
With generalized  subsidies  the middle classes  would have been linked to the poor in a
significant  way.
In his fascinating  account of the targeting of social programs  in Brazil, Macedo
"'A theoretical  analysis  of the impact of political  economy  constraints  on the analysis  of
price reform  is provided  in Braverman  and Kanbur [19871.12
[1987]  has also  highlighted  political  aspects  of poverty  alleviation  strategies. He concludes
that "if policy  changes  were  introduced  at the highest  levels  of decision-maling  in Brazil,
then many changes  would follow at  the level of programs,  both in their design and
management".
The political equilibrium  is a  significant  determinant of what types of poverty
alleviation  programs  may be sustained. Proper consideration  of it might lead one away
from programs  which  give benefits  only to those  with income  below  z towards  those which
are more  universal  and a source  of political  cohesion.
6. Targeting  Usg  Indicators
In  view of  the  informational and  administrative difficulties encountered in
implementing  the ideal solution, it  may be  worthwhile  enacting poverty alleviation
programs  through  targeting  key indicators  (e.g. a household's  region  or the age distribution
of its members). In LDCs  where  income  is very difficult  to meauure  this solution  may be
particularly  pertinent. However,  such  targeting  may be relevant more  widely  (see Deaton
and Stern [19861  and Akerlof  [19781).  World  Bank  [19861  discusses  the use of geographical
area for targeting.  Under such a  scheme,  all individuals uithin an area are treated
identically - (as with the  universalistic scheme depicted in Figures 3 and 4)  - but only
certain areas  are chosen  to receive  benefit. These  are the low income  neighborhoods  which
are easier  to identify  than individual  incomes. The aim,  in general  is to find an indicator
which  is less costly  to identify  but is sufficiently  correlated  with income  to be useful for
poverty  alleviation. Whilst.  there is bound  to be some  leakage,  no indicator  being  perfectly
correlated  with income,  it is hoped that any leakage  of benefits  to those who are not in
poverty  is much  less  expensive  than administering  the cumbersome  ideal solution.
Continuing  the regional  metaphor,  household  income  and expenditure  surveys' 2 can
1 2Such  as those  being  conducted,  with World  Bank support  in Cote d'Ivoire. Peru, Ghana
and Marutania.13
be used to evaluate  the poverty  characteristics  of individual  regions  as finely  as sample  size
will allow.  How can this information  be used to develop  a priority ranking  of regions?
This problem  has been analyzed  in Kanbur [1986]. The answer  depends  upon the precise
objectives  of the government,  and how the expenditure  devoted  to each group translates
itself  into individual  incomes 1 3. If the government's  objective  is to have  as big an impact  as
possible  on the national  poverty  gapl then the relevant  regional  ranking  is one by incidence
of poverty  in each region  (not by the regional  poverty gap). An intuitive account  of this
result follows  from considering  the "poverty  alleviation  efficiency"  of a uniform  transfer  to
a region. If every income  in a region  is increased  by S1, the cost is S1 times the total
number  of people,  while  the increase  in poor  incomes  is 81 times  the number  of poor people
in that region. The poverty alleviation  efficiency  is simply the ratio of the latter to the
former,  which  is just the incidence  of poverty  in that region.
This argument from Kanbur [1986]  can apply to any method of classifying  the
population  (i.e. it need  not be regional). Household  size  and composition  could  be used to
condition  payments  if this was felt to be easy to monitor.  For example  the number  of
children  might be chosen  as an indicator. In fact, combinations  of region,  of residence  and
household  characteristics  could  be used, as was  done  in Colombia:
"In Colombia  areas of poverty  were  identified  as part of the national  development
plan.  Targets of food subsidies  were then narrowed  to households  with children
under  five  years  old or a pregant  or lactating woman. This reduced  the number  of
possible beneficiaries  and thus lowered administrative and fiscal costs.  Little
leakage  or fraudulent  Wupon  use  was  apparent" (World  Bank, 1986).
If the number  of indicators  is pushed  to the limit, we  would  be back  to a case where
every  unit was being  identified  separately. The beauty  of using  just a few  indicators  is that
administrative costs are  kept low while leakage is  less that  it  would be  under a
"Those interetsed  in the details  should  consult  Kanbur  [1986,  1987b].
4i.e.  the aggregate  of  individual  short falls  of Income  from the poverty  lie  for  poor  people.14
universalistic  scheme,  so that more poverty  alleviation  could  be achieved  with the same
resources.  This  suggests a  focus for future research on  LDCs in  which there is
quantification  of the impact of targeting according  to different characteristics. In fact
there are three important  decision  variables  to which  data should  speak:
(i)  Given a set of partitions of characteristics  (e.g. regional  boundaries)  what levels of
benefit  are appropriate?
(ii)  Where should the divisimns  be made between different groups, i.e. where should
boundaries  be drawn,  e.g. if targeting  is according  to age?
(ii)  How  many  partitions  should  there be e.g. how  many  age  bands  or regional  areas?
These questions provide exciting possibilities  for both theoretical and empirical
work' 5. As more and more categories  are introduced,  then the targeting achieved  by
indicators  becomes  finer  and poverty  is reduced. On the other hand, more  categories  raises
administrative  costs (a further justification  for the position  depicted  in Figure 7).  The
optimal policy equates the marginal  reduction  in poverty  from a further indicator being
used with its marginal administrative  cost.  This is illustrated in Figure 9 where n to
denotes  the number  of indicators,  C(n) is the marginal  cost of more  indicators  and P(n) is
the marginal gain ca poverty as a function  of the number of indicators.  The optimal
number  of indicators  is n*.
Interesting empirical  work has already begun in this area.  Ravallion  and Chao
(1987]  illustrate how  the benefits  of region-based  targeting  can be quantified. They  first of
all calculate,  for a given  budget,  the poverty  level  that could  be achieved  with optimal  use
of regional  poverty  information,  following  the analysis  of Kanbur [1986,  1987bJ.  The gain
from targeting  is then defined  as the amount  by which  an untargeted  budget  would  have  to
be larger  in order to achieve  the poverty  level attained through  targeting. They call this
the "equivalent  gain from targetingn. They present  evidence  for Bangladesh,  Philippines
"5For  an overview  of how the available  published  evidence  for Latin America  might be
used, see  Kanbur [1987dJ.15
and Sri Lanka. For the first two countries  they distinguish  between  the urban and rural
sectors, for the last they consider  urban, rural and estate sectors.  Their illustrative
exercises  show  that the gains  from indicator  based targeting  very greatly from country  to
country,  ranging  from almost  40%  in the Philippines  to around  2%  in Bangladesh.  Another
interesting  conclusion  is that the percentage  gains  from targeting  are greater the smaller  is
the budget.
A much more  detailed  analysis  of targeting  using  indicators  is provided  in Ravallion
[1988],  which focuses  on land-contingent  transfers, i.e. transfers of income are given
contingent  on land ownership. This is attractive since  land ownership  is often observable
where income is not.  Such transfers are almost always a feature of policy discussion,
particularly  in Asia  and Latin America. For the specific  case of Bangladesh  he concludes
that "the equivalent  gain from targeting  with unrestricted  land-contingent  tax powers  is
only  slightly  more  than 10 per cent of mean  income  for rural Bangladesh  or 20 per cent of
mean  poverty deficit  of the poor". These  gains  have to be set against  the administrative
costs of land contingent  polities. this suggests  a further case for studying  administrative
costs  of poverty  alleviation  programs  as we  outlined  above.
Another type of targeting via indicators  occurs  when  certain foods  are subsidized
because  it is though that they are primarily  consumed  by the poor.  Besley  and Kanbur
[1988]  distinguish  between  two types  of  food  subsidy  program:  (i) where  a fixed  quantity  of
food is provided  at below  market prices  and (ii) where  the market price is subsidized  for
every unit that is purchased. If resale  of rations cannot  be prevented,  then the first type of
program  is equivalent  to an income  transfer  to all those  eligible  for the program. The size
of the transfer  is equal  to the ration quantity times  the unit subsidy. The central question
then becomes  the criterion  according  to which  ration shops  are located  in particular  areas,
or according  to which ration cards are issued within an area.  The second  type of food
subsidy program  is one which  benefits  consumers  in proportion  to their consumption  of
commodity  in question. Thus, in absolute  terms, the rich gain more than the poor if the16
commodity is not an inferior good. Besley  and Kanbur [1988)  show that if the objective is
to minimize the aggregate poverty gap at the national level, the appropriate indicator to
use is the ratio:
Quantity  Consumed by  Poor
Total  Quantity  Consumed
Commodities should be ranked according  to this ratio and those highest on the list should
be prime candidates for protection dnuing  the period of retrenchment on the food subsidy  1.
Notice  that  the  above  ratio  can  be  calculated  using  household income  and
expenditure surveys.  Indeed, this is done in  Kanbur [1988] to  argue that  rice in  Cote
d'Ivoire is not a prime candidate for subsidy. The importance of this ratio has indeed been
grasped in the policy  literature.  World Bank [1986]  notes:
"The main determinant of food's suitability for subsidy is the share of it that  goes
to the target population.  If a food is consumed  exclusively  by the target group, the
subsidy will be very efficient;  a  dollar's worth of subsidy will provide almost a
dollar of added income to the target group.  But if the target population consumes
only 30 per cent of a subsidized  food, the subsidy is much less efficient".
However, it  can be shown (see Besley and Kanbur  [1988]) that  the  use of  the
"consumption  by poor" ratio is strictly valid only when the objective  is minimization of the
aggregate poverty gap.  Different rules come into  operation if tL  poverty  alleviation
objective pays special attention, for example, to  the poorest of the poor and when Engel
c-urves  for food show significant  nonlinearity.
Finally, we take up the case where individual responses are such as to  allow the
possibility of  changing between the  categories being used for targeting.  An  obvious
example is the relocation of families to areas where ration shops are present, or increasing
family size if  that  is  being used  as an  indicator.  Roberts [1983] provides a  general
16Besley  and Kanbur [19881  also presents generalizations  of this rule.17
theoretical analysis of such problems.  Clearly, if individuals can respond to  the use of
non-income indicators by  manipulating their indicator to  advantage, the  policy maker
should take this into account.  The central question is whether the incentives of poorer
families to do so are greater than those of the richer families.  For example, if migration
costs are smaller as a percentage of richer household  income the "wrong" households  may
move in response to the setting up of a ration shop in a distant area.  Once again, detailed
research is needed to  quantify the tradeoffs involved.  If these responses are sufficiently
adverse, even the  use of  non-income indicators for targeting comes under  question -
creating a further argument in favor of more universalistic schemes.
7. Self Targeting
An alternative approach to  targeting involves designing schemes which are based
upon broad, self-acting tests which only the truly poor would pass.  We shall refer to such
schemes as  "self targeting".  In general, programs of this kind  involve an agent either
making a  non-monetary  payment to  receive an income transfer or receiving a payment
in-kind  rather  than in cash.  We shall first  discuss two paradigmatic examples of such
schemes  before drawing some general conclusions  about their design.
7.1 Workfare:
A workfare scheme operates by making a claimant of poor relief give up labour time
in exchange for an income transfer.  There are two reasons for doing 8017. First, those who
are poor may have a lower opportunity cost of labour time relative to others and hence, for
a  given income transfer,  are  prepared to  give up  more labour time.  Hence, a  work
requirement may serve to screen the truly deserving  from the rest.  Such a test of eligibility
has figured centrally in Indian famine relief policy (see Dreze [1986]). Its efficacy depends
'?For further discussion,  see Besley  and Coate (1988).18
crucially upon whether the hypothesis  that the opportunity cost of time is lower for target
groups.  Holding other things equal, it  seems likely that  this  would be so.  If however,
poorer  families have  greater  household commitments,  for  example  to  child  rearing
activities, then  work requirements would be a poor targeting device.  Alderman [19871
presents evidence suggesting that  having to  wait in line for food is a discouragement for
many  consumers.  His  evidence  also  questions  the  view  that  the  poor  gain
disproportionately  from using such allocation mechanisims.
A second reason for wishing to  impose a work requirement is that  it  encourages
certain kinds of behavior.  Hence, it may encourage agents to invest  in skill formation
which makes it  less likely that  they will require poor relief in  future.  Whether this
argument works depends upon whether there is a link between key investment decisions
and the availability of poor relief.  In the context of the United States, this has proved to
be a controversial  issue (see, for example, Murray [1984]). There seems however  to be very
little research on this issue in the context of LDC's.
7.2 Transfers In-Kind
Targeting of certain groups in  the  population can  also be achieved by  making
transfers  in  kind,  a  point  first  clearly explained by  Nicholls and  Zeckhauser [1982].
Consider, for  example, a  good which is  demanded discretely such  as  an  educational
qualification or a course of medical treatment  (see Besley and Coate [1989)  for a detailed
analysis of this problem).  Such goods are typically available at different quality levels. If
the State  provides a  certain quality level free of charge, then a  consumer must  choose
between public and  private  provision weighing up the  cost of buying the  good in  the
private market.  If the government can find a quality level such that  the demand for the
publicly provided good is only from the poor, then quality choice provides a self acting test
on the basis of which the poor can be targeted.  Moreover,  such targeting is consistent with
the government having limited information  about the poor population.19
There are three  main principles behind this argument.  First,  quality must be a
normal good.  Note that when taste variation is brought into the picture, then matters are
somewhat  complicated.  For  example,  religious affiliations may  be  an  important
determinant  of a  consumer's propensity to  use certain kinds of medical services.  The
correlation between tastes for quality and incomes then becomes  important and the present
story overlaps with the statistical targeting story of the last section.  Second,  there must be
a private market for the publicly provided good at the higher quality level.  This certainly
inhibits the applicability of this sort of targeting in the context of LDC's since often the
only private sector alternatives are of a kind that only those with very high incomes can
afford.  Third is the related point that one must be able to find a quality level at which
only some fraction of the  population make use of the  publicly provided good.  This is
required since otherwise, in-kind  transfers are dominated by transfers of cash of the same
value.  This is because transfers in kind carry a dead weight loss due to the fact that cash
can be spent upon what ever a consumer  wishes.  In general, this deadweight loss can be
tolerated only if there is a gain from targeting particular groups.
Both kinds of self-targeting schemes that  we have discussed, require the  effective
prohibition of a secondary market in the publicly provided good.  For example, it must be
impossible for a rich consumer to get a poor consumer  to undertake his work requirement
in order for him to get his benefit.  Similarly, those who do not wish to consume public
education should be unable to  sell their right to a school place to another.  In practice,
there  are many commodities for which this restriction can be enforced.  However, this
requirement does suggest that,  in general, food will not be an acceptable commodity for a
self-targeting  scheme.  Typically,  it  would be impossible to  prevent  unwanted food
allocations from being claimed by consumers  who were not poor and then sold.  Hence, the
gains from the program would cease to be targeted.
The two theories of targeting under limited information which we have identified
here are best viewed as complementary  with each other.  For example, a workfare scheme20
located in a particular region draws motivation  from both statistical and self targeting
considerations.  We believe  that many thoughtfully  designed  targeting  schemes  will have
this property.
8. Conlusion
In the wake  of recent calls for finer targeting  of poverty  alleviation  expenditure  in
developing  countries,  we have  investigated  some  of the principles  of targeting. We posited
an "ideal solution", where transfers went to the poor and only to  the poor, as the
bwechmark  for discussion  and as the rationale  for current trends in the policy  debate. But
the ideal solution fails to take into account  three crucial aspects of the rei. world: (i)
administrative  and informational  costs of implementation,  (ii) individual  responses  and
inc.ntive effects  and (iii) the political  economy  of the problem. It has been argued  that
each of these militates against the ideal solution. The optimal strategy  will probably  lie
somewhere  between  the two extremes  of the ideal solution and complete  universalism,
mediated  by each  of the three considerations  above.
All of the  above suugests the need for more country specific  research which
quantifies  the costs and benefits  of targeting  using  the variety of micro  level  data that has
increasingly  become  available  for many developing  countries;  research  which  is sensitive  to
the political  feasibilities  of reform.21
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princiDleg of Taraetina  for a Class of Poverty Measures.
1.  Consider  the poverty  index suggested by  Foster, Grear  and
Thorbecke  11984]  given by,
- .-  . _
P9 z)  -°  fz  j  dF(y)  ao,  (1.1)
where  y - income  z - poverty  line
a - a poverty alleviation parameter
F(y) - distribution function of income
This  poverty  measure  encompasses  some  commonly  used
poverty measures as special cases.
P^(z) - F(z)  - 8  (1.2)
the "head-count"  measure of poverty which tells one how many poor
people there are  in the population.  This can be questioned for
failing to give us any information about the "depth" of poverty,
i.e. how poor-the poor are.  Hence the indicator
(z  - FP.
P1(z) - (z) - IH  (1.3)
where Fp _  |O y  F  : the mean income of the poor.  This gives
the average shortfall from the poverty line times the proportion
of the population is poor.  However, such an indicator gives us no
information  about  the  distribution  of  income  amongst24
the poor which is often  thought desirable.  This norresponds t.
this index when a - 2.
P2 (z)  - H(I 2 +  (1.1)  2,2  1/2  (1.4)
2  ~~~~~p
where  °p  - J0  y)  the  coefflcient of  variation  of p 0.  2  ~~F(Z)
income amongst the poor.  It should be clear that If income is
equally distributed  amongst the poor then (1.4)  reduces to (1.3)
This form of poverty indicator provides a convenient way
of  modeling  the  impact  of  policies  oriented  towards  the
alleviation of poverty.  For our purposes it also has the useful
property of decomposibility.  Specifically
P fz) =iliP.cz)  (1.5)
i'Y I~~~~~~
where 7  is the population share and P (z) the poverty index of
the ith group in poverty.
2.  The "Ideal"  Solution
If y is observable before intervention  or equivalently the
government  has  enough  information  to  calculate  what  an
individual's y  would  have  been  without  intervention, then  the
ideal solution gives every agent a transfer  of z - y so that after
intervention,  each has an income equal to at least z and no matter
what a  is chosen, Pa (z)  is zero, i.e. there is no poverty.  The
revenue required to effect such a policy is25
Cz  - p)F(z)  P1(z)  (2.1)
and all of this revenue goes to the poor.
3.  A UniL. sal Transfer Scheme.
Under  a  universal  transfer  scheme  a  benefit  which  we
denote  by  lb' Is given  to rich  and  poor alike.  In this case
poverty is given by
P (z  ,b)  z  J-b  y - b]°dF(y)  (3.1)
Note that the limit of integration is altered  since all those with
incomes  greater than z - b will have left poverty completely.  All
those remaining in poverty receive post transfer incomes of y +  b.
If the universal benefit were set at z then all agents will have
left poverty under this scheme also.  However, the revenue costs
of  poverty  alleviation  in  this  case  would  be *z  (normalising
population  size  at  one).  Hence  the  reduction  in  revenue
requirements  from having a perfectly targeted  scheme is
z _ (z - PP)F(z) *  (1 - H)a  +  Hpp  (4.1)
an amount which  is increasing in z, pP  decreasing in H.  This
required revenue difference is a weighted sum of the poverty line
and the mean income of the poor.26
5.  The Effects of Costly Take-unt,
This class of poverty indicators can be used to model the
effects  of  costly  take  up.  Imagine  that  although  all  other
conditions of the ideal solution are met, individuals face a  mcst
'c' of c.  ;iming  which is not recouped from the transfer  prograv,Ne.
In this instance all of  those with  incomes less than z - c will
claim whilst those with incomes above will not.  Residual poverty
is then amongst the non-claiming group
'r(z,c)  f_  z-c [L..  J]  dF(y)  (5.1)
and the cost of the scheme is reduced to
(z  - p )F(z - c)  (5.2)
where pm  fZOc y  .(Y))  is the mean income  of those who continue
to  claim  the  benefit  on  offer.  The  amount  in  (5.2)  could
alternatively be given in the form of a universal benefit b.  We
might ask how high c must then be before so few people claim that
a  universal benefit leads  to less poverty than with  :ae_-  'ideal
solution"  with take-up costs.  Besley E19881 shows that when a-1,
this value of costs is given by
1This section is based on Besley E1988].27
c  U  (z-)  (5.3)
where  Hu  fz-b  dFiy)  pu  f  1z-b  y+b 
r  ?di(r)  .dF(y)
X_---  fZ¢dF(y)  1  fz-cy  F(Z)F(z-c)
K f-  dF(y)
This "critical"  cost  has three  components
*i)  (1  - H¶(Z  - P  )  (5.4)
which gives  the  proportion  of the previously  finely targeted
benefit  which  now goes to other individuals. This measures  the
"leakage"  from  a previously  targeted  benefit  to those  who  did not
claim  and those  who are not  poor.  The critical  cost rises  with
this,  as one might  have  anticipated.
(ii)  (i  -t  )  (5.5)
the dlfference in mean incomes between the universalistic  and
scheme  and "ideal  solution"  with take-up  costs.  The larger  the
difference  in  mean  incomes  between  a  means  tested  and
universalistic  scheme,  the  smaller  the  critical  cost.
(iii)  t(z  r)  (5.6)
the extent  of poverty  in the group  who do not claim  any benefit
since it is too costly  for it to be worthwhile. If a  =  2 were
chosen  then the cutical  cost  would also depend  upon idicators  of
the  distribution of income amonst the poor.  The greater is28
poverty  in  the  group  who  dQ  not  claim  in  the  means  tested
programme, the smaller is the critical cost above which universal
provision is preferred.  Further resuts for the case in which &=2
and some simulations assuming a lognormal income distribution are
given ir  esley [19883.
6.  Budaetarv Rules for Taraeted Groups.2
Consider splitting the population into mutually exclusive
groups according  to some observable characteristic (e.g. age or
region of  residence).  We  shall  label  these  groups  1  and  2.
Aggregate poverty is
p&(z)  =  x1P1, (z) +  x2P2,(z)  (6.1)
where x  is the population share of the ith group.  Suppose now
that the state has a budget B to dispense amongst the two groups
and  that  it  can  give different additive transfers of income to
those in groups 1 and 2 respectively.  What rule should it pursue
in doing this?  The government's budget constraint is given by
x1b1 +  x2b2 -B  (6.2)
Minimizing (6.1) subject to (6.2)  yields,
P  =  A  (a constant)  I - 1,2  (6.3)
2This section is based on Kanbur C19861.29
that Is,  the optimal budgetary :rule equates the P  i  indlces of
the two groups.  Hence  if the income gap measure of poverty  is
used  (PI(z)),  then  the  optimal  budgetary  rule  equates  the
headcount-  over  the  two  groups.  To  get  some  grasp  on  the
differenct oetween the transfer given on a targeted and untargeted
basis we expand the equality
P  ,0-l  P2,&-2  (6.4)
to the first order around the untargeted benefit outcome to obtain
p  p~~2,.-li
71  in  (a  +  a  ]  (6.5)
where  7i  - bi  - xiB  i.e.  the  difference  in  the  government
expenditure  share  that  goes  to  the  ith group  under  targeting
versus  the non  targeting  situtation and ai  /x  Since
1+ 7  =  0  if  the  budget  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  the
expression  for  A2  i.  easlly  obtained.  Note  that  the highest
benefit  will  go  to  that  group  with  the  highest  P, 1 in  the
untargeted state.
Equation (6.6) can be used to give an expression for gain
in terms of poverty alleviation  from targeting.  Using a  linear
3See Besley and Kanbur  [19881 for details and the generalisation
of this argument.30
expansion around the untargeted polnt yieldS4
T  NT  (P  -P  )
oP  Po  ' - (&/z)  *  2,-1  (6.6)
(a1 +  a2 )
which  is rroportional to the squared difference between the P  1
index of the two goups which are now being targeted.  This gives
us a measure of the gain that can be obtained by targeting using
the type of budgetary rule discribed in (6.3).
Measures of the fineess of targeting can be obtained by
examining what proportion  of the benefits go to the poor.  For the
untargeted case
Fu  H  (6.7)
and for the targeted  case
FT  S  H  b 1 + 2 b 2
b
m  H +  b  (6.8)
Using (6.5)
H7l  I  H272  (-  (&  12  l  - P2,,-1)  (6.9)
4  Se  2B
45ee Besley and Kanbur Elg881.31
If &-2  this always positive since  the teFm in the numerator  of
(6.9) is (H-H- 2).
7.  Fooj_F-bsidies and Poverty Alleviation 5
iv represent the impact of food subsidies  we shall use the
consumer's equivalent income function which is defined implicitly
from,
u(p, Y)  =  u(q, y)  (7.1)
where u(-, *)  is the consumer's indirect utility function, p is a
set of reference prices, q actual prices, y actual income and yE
equivalent income.  When utility  is monotonically increasing in
income 6 we use (7.1) to give the function
YE =  g(p, q. Y)  (7.2)
We can then specify the poverty line in equivalent income space
and denote it by zE, which then implies a cut-off in income space
defined by the z which satisfies
g(p, q, z) , Z  (7.3)
5This section is based upon Besley and K%nbur C19871.
6 Which  requires that the direct utility function be increasing in
its arguments.32
In this instance our poverty indicators is  given by
e  z  zzE yE  a
P (z)  |Z  E  - dF(y),7.4
where it should.  be noted that z is a function  of p, q and zE,  The
poverty indicator is now directly a function of the prices  faced
by  the cornsumer,  and we  can consider changes in such prices and
their impact  upon poverty.  Differentiating  with respect to gi and
evaluating the outcome at q  p, whence y  and y and zE and z are
the same, we haveT
e
|=p  a  x  (q, y)dF(y)  (7.5)
dqi  q=p  0  I~q  d(
This is a weighted sum of the demands where weights are derived
from the PQ  class of poverty measures. Consider now  the  choice
between increasing the subsidy to two goods.  Let s1 and s- denote 1  ~2
their respective subsidles and
slfxl(q. y)dF(y) +  sJ2fx 2(q, y)dF(y)  8  (7.6)
denote the government's budget constraint.  Differentiating (7.6)
to impose  a budget balance condition we find that impact a subsidy
to good 1 financed by a  tar.  on good 2 to reduce poverty is given
7The derivate of the equivalent  income function is obtained from
(7.1)  using Roy's identity.33
by
dq  P  (z  *  j  dF (y)  (7.7)
where xs  fx (q,  y)dF(y)  is the mean demand  for  good  i  on an
economy  wide basis.  The ratio xi/xi  s9  the demand for good i by a
particular poor  person  in  relation to the average demand.  The
rule  ln  (7.7) says  that  subsidizing good  1  and  taxing  good  2
reduces poverty  if  the  weighted  sum  of  x/x  exceeds  that of
x2/x2.  In the case in which e-  1 the (7.7)  becomes
dP (z)  P
3  >0  - - >  0  (7.8)
where xi  f  x  (q, y)dF(y)/F(y) is the mean consumption of good i
by the poor.  This  conf  rms the World Bank view that one should
target  the subsidy towards the good which has the highest ratio of
demand  by  the poor  to  mean  demand.  Other simple  rules can be
obtained from (7.7) if preferences are restricted.
if  xI(q,  y) '  71(q)  4  i(q)y  (7.9)
i.e. Engel curves are affine in lncome 5 then
8Preferences  are quasi-homothetic.34
dP:  (z)  r7  2:  '  2-
1 p  z  x  1P  x2  ¢1  1  2  (7;10)
Now, whether a  subsidy  on good  1  financed by  a  tax  on good  2
reduces  )overty  depends  upon  wighted  diflferences in  demand
coefficients  where  weights  are  P,  indices--  Further
generalisations  are  given  in  Besley  and  Kanbur  C19871.  For
practical  purposes  rules  of  the  kind  given  in  (7.7)  may  be
implementable.  Most estimated demand functions can be written in
their P8 form since almost all lie in the class
xIq,  Y)  =  (7i(q)  +  li(q)y  +Oi(q)f(Y)  (7.11)
for some function f(y).  Which foods should be "targeted" in this
framework depends upon the shapes of Engel curves and various of
the PO indices.
Other  food  subsidy  schemes  are  of  the  "ration  shop
variety"  in which a  fixed amount  of subsidy is given below the
market price.  If resale of any unwanted food is permissable then
we are effectively  back to the type of scheme discussed in section
6  without  targeting  subgroups  (unless different  subsidies  are
given to different groups, e.g. by strategic location shops with
only residents of these areas able to qualify).  An intermediate
scheme is one in which resale is not permitted.  If the good being
sold  through a  ration  shop  is normal  then  there  will  be  some
income  level  y, say, at which  take-up is complete and  the food
subsidy is iust like an income transfer.  For incomes below y, it35
will be just like the marginal food subsidy discussed above. Under
such a scheme poverty is given by
j0 [f-  -v  ]  (  4  JY  [d  - dYCy)  (7./)
where  m  R  -pi)xR where x  is the quantity available from a
ration shop.  The effect on poverty of a change in the subsidy now
has two components which are like the food subsidy rule in (7.5)
for  these with  incomes less than y  and an addltive transfer to
those  with  incomes  above.  This  suggests  the  importance  of
modeling behaviour vis a vis take-up of unwanted food in a ration
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